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tion, is one to paralyze the judicial conscience." ' Thus it is forseeable
that an action for damages or an injunction could be maintained by a
non-signatory airline or the government, and perhaps the government
could maintain a criminal action."' 9
RIGHT OF WAY ACQUISITION, DAMAGE PROBLEM CREATED
BY THE LIMITED ACCESS HIGHWAY
I. RIGHT OF WAY ACQUISITION
In 1956 Congress initiated the National System of Interstate and
Defense Highways' designed to provide safe, limited access highways
linking all parts of the United States. As in any new program of this
magnitude, certain problems have become apparent, and foremost is that
of right of way acquisition. Indiana's experience in this area is typical.'
108. Apgar Travel Agency v. International Air Transp. Ass'n, 107 F. Supp. 706,
711 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
109. The quotation in the text accompanying note 99, supra indicates that a crimi-
nal prosecution might be a special consideration. Putnam v. Air Transp. Ass'n of Amer-
ica, 112 F. Supp. 885, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) suggests another possible limitation: "There
may well be however, a determinitive distinction between exempting parties from the
operation of such statutory expressions of public policy on the one hand and from the
operation of the rules of the common law on the other hand."
The unions also argued that the agreement could not be approved because if a sub-
sidized carrier became a party to the Pact the government mail pay would be used to
break a "lawful strike," but the Board properly reserved judgment on this issue until it
is properly before them, since none of the present members of the Pact were on sub-
sidy at the time of the decision. The Board is charged with fixing the rate which a
carrier receives for transporting mail, 72 Stat. 763 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1376 (a) (1958),
and subsection (b) of the same section requires that the "need of each such air carrier
for compensation . . . together with all other revenue . . . to enable . . . [it] under
honest, economical, and efficient management, to maintain and continue the development
of air transportation . . ." be considered in determining this rate. It has been held
that the fact that a strike will be subsidized is not to be considered by the Board in
determining the rate for mail transported, so the union argument seems invalid. Ameri-
can Overseas Airlines v. CAB, 254 F. 2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1958). It has been said, how-
ever, that strike losses resulting from other than "honest, economical, and efficient
management" cannot be taken into account, but those occurring through no fault of the
management may be, with the Board making the determination as to the cause of the
losses. American Overseas Airlines v. CAB, supra. Since all revenue, including non-
flight revenue, Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 347 U.S. 67 (1954), must be considered
in determining a carrier's need for subsidy, it may be that income from the Pact must be
considered, but expenditures will be taken into account only if the Board finds these to
be a product of "honest, economical, and efficient management"
1. The Interstate System was established by the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944,
ch. 626, §7, 58 Stat. 838, but it was not until the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956, ch.
462, §108(b), 70 Stat. 378, that the necessary funds were provided.
2. Letter from Ia. State Highway Commission to the Indiana Law Journal, encl.
2, Oct. 14, 1949.
NOTES
Before the advent of the Interstate System, Indiana averaged ten to fif-
teen highway condemnation suits a year. On December 31, 1959, 732
highway right of way condemnation suits were pending in the State, and
the State had placed $9,432,490.06 in escrow, pending determination of
these suits.' This increase in condemnation suits occurred despite the
fact that Indiana is required by statute to make an effort to purchase the
needed property before condemnation proceedings are commenced.4
Right of way acquisition in Indiana involves two basic functions,
appraisal and negotiation, and each function is delegated to separate sec-
tions within the State Highway Department. The Department appraises
all parcels before attempting to negotiate with the land owner and em-
ploys staff and independent fee appraisers for this purpose. If the value
of the parcel to be acquired is $25,000.00 or more, two appraisals are
made. All appraisals are submitted to a reviewing appraiser who ex-
amines each appraisal for accuracy and correctness and determines the
fair cash market value of the parcel to be acquired. This determination
of the offering price terminates the function of the appraisal section.'
The offering price is submitted to the negotiation section which
thenceforth assumes the responsibility for procuring the parcel by send-
ing a representative to contact the owner. The negotiating representative
has a limited function, for in negotiating with the land owner he may not
depart from the offering price determined by the reviewing appraiser.6
Consequently, the representative's function is, in actuality, not one of
negotiating but consists of 1) convincing the land owner that the offer
represents the fair cash market value of his property and 2) persuading
the land owner to accept the offer. If the land owner can present evi-
dence that the appraisal on which the State's offer is based is erroneous,
reappraisals are obtained by repeating the entire appraisal process. If,
however, the land owner cannot prove to the satisfaction of the represen-
tative that the State's appraisal is erroneous, and if he refuses to accept
the price offered by the representative of the negotiation section, the
parcel must be condemned.7
Forty-three states' require at least one appraisal prior to negotiating
3. IND. ATT'Y GEN. OFFICE, REPORT OF CONDEMNATION ACTIVITY 1958 AND 1959.
This report also shows that during the period covered, 966 condemnation suits were
filed for highway right of way.
4. IND. ANN. STAT. §3-1701 (Burns 1946).
5. Interview with Chief Appraiser, Right of Way Dep't, State Highway Dep't of
Ind., in Indianapolis, Jan. 22, 1960.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. To ascertain how other states have met the problem created by increased right
of way acquisition, a questionnaire was sent to the highway department of each state,
and answers were received from forty-three. No questionnaire was sent to the State
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a voluntary sale, and every appraisal must be reviewed by a reviewing
appraiser. In eight states, however, it is a matter of policy to offer the
land owner the amount of the highest appraisal which is acceptable to the
reviewing appraiser.' Thirty-five states use both staff and fee ap-
praisers ; five states use fee appraisers only, and three states use only staff
appraisers. Twenty-five of the states prefer that the appraiser be a resi-
dent of the vicinity where the appraisal is to be made.'"
The amount of variation from the original appraisal price which is
permitted in negotiation is of primary importance in right of way ac-
quisition. Two different methods are utilized by various states: 1) the
"one price-one offer" method and 2) the "limited bargaining" method.
Thirty-five states (thirty-six including Indiana) follow the "one price-
one offer" method by determining a price to be offered the land owner
and forbidding the negotiator to depart from it. These states contend
that such a plan is fairest to all land owners, for a land owner who re-
ceives compensation because the state wishes to avoid litigation receives
compensation in addition to the fair market value of his land, while a
land owner who accepts the state's offer is penalized because he receives
compensation only for the market value of his land. Thus, the "one price-
one offer" states believe that "horse-trading" rewards the uncooperative
land owner while penalizing the cooperative land owner.1 Eight states
permit the negotiator to adjust the offering price during negotiations
With the land owner to a limited extent: ten percent of the selected ap-
praisal in Mississippi, 12 "very, very limited amount" in Idaho," "slight"
in Delaware,14 "not substantially outside the range of the appraisals se-
cured" in Ohio.'5 Connecticut allows a compromise method not utilized
by any other state by which the land owner or his attorney is permitted to
submit appraisals from independent appraisers recognized by the State
Highway Department. By following this procedure, the negotiator may
effectuate a compromise which exceeds the state's highest appraisal.'"
Highway Dep't of Indiana, as the necessary information was received in the interview
with Chief Appraiser, Right of Way Dep't, supra note 5. A tabulation of the results of
this survey is on file in the office of the Izdiana Law tournal.
9. Indiana does not follow this policy.
10. Tabulation of results of survey, supra note 8.
11. State of Cal., Dep't of Pub. Works, Div. of Highways, Circular Letter 59-80,
March 20, 1959, pg. 1. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, Right of Way Dep't, Memoran-
dum 57-1, Jan., 1957, pg. 1.
12. Letter from Miss. State Highway Comm'n to the Indiana Law Journal, Oct. 20,
1959.
13. Letter from Idaho Dep't of Highways to the Indiana Law Journal, Oct. 21,
1959.
14. Letter from Del. State Highway Dep't to the Indiana Law Journal, Oct. 18, 1959.
15. Letter from Ohio Dep't of Highways to the Indiana Law Journal, Oct. 23, 1959.
16. Letter from Conn. Highway Dep't to the Indiana Law Journal, Oct. 14, 1959.
NOTES
The states adhering to "limited bargaining" contend that value is a quan-
tity which cannot be determined exactly 7 and that limited adjustments
are justified to avoid the cost of condemnation litigation." In addition
the negotiator does not appear to be uncompromising, and the give and
take which is common to open market sales is preserved, thus facilitating
voluntary settlement. The "limited bargaining" method represents an
attempt to find some middle ground between "horse-trading"'" and the
''one price-one offer" method.
Regardless of the method used, a state must meet certain require-
ments of the Bureau of Public Roads to be eligible to receive federal
funds for the Interstate System. At least one appraisal must be secured
prior to negotiation, and if the first appraisal is in excess of $25,000.00,
a second appraisal is required. Before negotiation, all appraisals must
be reviewed by a supervisor in the right of way division who is com-
petent to approve right of way appraisals, and negotiation for purchase
may not be carried on by the person who appraised the parcel." Docu-
mentation and support of every voluntary settlement are required by the
Bureau, and every settlement must be based on the determination by a re-
viewing appraiser of fair cash market value. If the reviewing appraiser
determines that the appraisals secured by the state represent fair cash
market value, he need only initial them. A subsequent settlement which
is "not substantially outside the range of such appraisals"" needs no
further documentation or support. If the reviewing appraiser deter-
mines that the fair cash market value is substantially outside the range
of the appraisals secured by the state, he must prepare a signed statement
of his reasons for such determination, and a subsequent settlement may
not "differ substantially from the value set forth in such statement.""
In arriving at fair cash market value, the requirements of the Bureau per-
mit the reviewing appraiser in each state to consider the "appraisals se-
cured by the State Highway Department and the property owner, recent
awards by condemnation juries for similar property in the same area, and
17. Letter from Idaho Dep't of Highways, supra note 13; Letter from Del. State
Highway Dep't, supra note 14.
18. Letter from Ohio Dep't of Highways, supra note 15.
19. The "one price-one offer" method is relatively new. Prior to its use right of
way was acquired in many instances by a negotiator who was told to acquire the prop-
erty and not to pay too much. No appraisals were made to guide the negotiator, and the
purchase price was the result of pure "horsetrading." See Letter from Idaho Dep't of
Highways, supra note 13.
20. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Pub. Roads, Policy and Procedure Memoran-
dum 21-4.1, Jan. 31, 1958.
21. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Pub. Roads, Circular Memorandum, July 11,
1958.
22. Ibid.
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any other pertinent value information .... .,23 The reviewing appraiser
is limited, however, in his determination to value considerations, and,
since amounts paid to avoid litigation are not based on value of the prop-
erty, this factor cannot be considered in arriving at an offering price.
In summary, the requirements of the Bureau strive to accomplish
first, fair and equal treatment to all land owners and second, acquisition
of right of way without excessive cost. These requirements do not neces-
sitate the use of the "one price-one offer" method which students of the
Interstate System believe is responsible for the increase in number of
right of way condemnation cases in Indiana. In support of this conten-
tion, the opponents of the "one price-one offer" method point out that
during 1958 and 1959 a total of forty-seven right of way condemnation
cases were tried by jury in Indiana. The total sum offered by the state
under the "one price-one offer" method was $370,653.64; however, the
jury verdicts totaled $747,371.41." 4 The significance of these figures
can hardly be overemphasized. The land owner, knowing this fact and
being confronted with what seems to him to be an adamant and unrea-
sonable attitude on the part of the negotiator, will hesitate to settle volun-
tarily. Consequently, the number of condemnation suits will continue to
be excessive. While some contend that the "one price-one offer" method
is the fairest to all land owners, if it is conceded that market value is dif-
ficult to determine exactly, adjustments within narrow, strict limits are
not unfair to other land owners who accept the state's first offer. Further-
more, it would seem to be in the best interest of the state and the Inter-
state System to avoid the expenses of condemnation when an amicable
settlement within these limits can be made. The "limited bargaining"
method would not alter the attitude of a land owner who has decided that
he will not part with his land short of condemnation; however, its ad-
vantage is that an undecided land owner might be induced by a slight
concession in his favor to settle voluntarily.
II. DAMAGE PROBLEM CREATED BY TlE LIMITED ACCESS HIGHWAY
A related problem to the appraisal and negotiation involved in right
of way acquisition is that of determination of damages. It is an ac-
cepted principle that the actual taking of a property right must be com-
pensated for by the state. The Interstate System however, presents an
area for consideration which is of particular significance in limited access
23. Ibid.
24. IND. Anr'y GEN. OFFICE, op. cit. supra note 3.
NOTES
highway" construction, namely, whether an abutting land owner's right
of access to a public highway is a property right.
It was recognized early in Indiana that the owner of land abutting on
a street or highway possesses a right in the street which cannot be taken
from him without compensation. -0  Shortly after this right was recog-
nized the court specified that the basis of this right was the ownership by
the abutting land owner of the fee simple to the center of the street." In
this case, the defendant railroad laid tracks down the center of the street
which abutted the plaintiff's land. Since the abutting land owner was
the owner of the fee over which the railroad's tracks passed, he was en-
titled to compensation for the additional burden placed on his fee simple.
This basis for the right of access would necessarily preclude recovery
where the obstruction was not upon the fee of the abutting land owner.
Thirteen years later, however, the Indiana court decided that an abutting
owner's right of access, when taken by a private individual or corpora-
tion, exists independently of his ownership of the fee in the street.2" The
court held that
the owners of lots abutting on a street may have a peculiar and
distinct interest in the easement in the street in front of their
lots. This interest includes the right to have the street kept
open and free from any obstruction which prevents or ma-
terially interferes with the ordinary means of ingress to and
egress from the lots.2"
The court has since consistently held that ownership of the fee is not
necessary for recovery of damages,3" and all that need be shown is a de-
nial of, or material interference with the abutting land owner's means of
ingress and egress.
Despite the abolition of ownership of the fee as a prerequisite to
recovery against a private individual or corporation, the court refused to
change this requirement where the access was taken on behalf of a govern-
mental unit. In Randall v. Board of Cornn'rs of Tippecanoe County,2 '
25. IND. ANN. STAT. §36-3102 (Bums 1949) defines limited access highway as a
"highway or street especially designed for through traffic, and over, from, or to which
owners or occupants of abutting land or other persons have no right or easement or
only a limited right or easement of direct access, light, air, or view by reason of the
fact that their property abuts upon such limited access facility ..
26. Tate v. Ohio & M. R.R., 7 Ind. 479 (1856).
27. Cox v. Louisville, N.A., & C. R.R., 48 Ind. 178 (1874).
28. Indiana, B. & W. Ry. v. Eberle, 110 Ind. 542, 11 N.E. 467 (1887).
29. Id. at 546, 11 N.E. at 469.
30. Martin v. Marks, 154 Ind. 549, 57 N.E. 249 (1900) ; Pittsburgh, C., & St.L.
Ry. v. Noftsger, 148 Ind. 101, 47 N.E. 332 (1897) ; Dantzer v. Indianapolis Union Ry.,
141 Ind. 604, 39 N.E. 223 (1894).
31. 77 Ind. App. 320, 131 N.E. 776, error dismissed, 261 U.S. 252 (1921).
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the abutting land owner had access to the approach to a bridge over the
Wabash River and had constructed permanent buildings at the grade of
this approach. A new bridge was constructed nine feet above the grade
of the old approach, and the abutting land was separated from the new
bridge by an airspace and a concrete railing. A more complete denial of
access can hardly be imagined. The court, however, held that since the
fee simple of the street was in the county, the abutting land owner could
not acquire any right in the street. In distinguishing the present case
from earlier cases where the right of access had been recognized, the court
stated that as against private persons or private corporations, all land
owners have the right of access; but when a governmental unit obstructs
an abutting property owner's access, there is no such right, even though
similar or greater damage results. The distinction made by the court
between access impairment by private individuals and governmental units
may be emphasized by comparing the Randall case with an earlier case' 2
where a railroad raised the grade of its tracks, thus necessitating the rais-
ing of the grade of a street running parallel to the tracks. The court held
that this constituted a material interference with the abutting land owner's
right of access and subjected the railroad to damages therefor.
Although an abutting land owner may not recover from a govern-
mental unit for loss of access where he does not own the fee upon which
the obstruction has been constructed, this is not the case where he pos-
sesses the fee simple in the street and the obstruction is situated thereon.
That he may recover for his loss of access in such a situation is aptly il-
lutrated by City of Cannelton v. Lewis 3 In this case the city constructed
a flood wall in the street abutting the land owner's property. It does not
specifically appear from the facts of the case that the floodwall was lo-
cated upon the abutting land owner's fee simple in the street; however,
the court stated that the flood wall was a change from the use to which
the street was originally dedicated. Such a statement indicates that the
fee was in the abutting land owner, and this is the only ground on which
the case can be distinguished from Randall where the court held that an
abutting land owner can acquire no rights in the street when the fee
simple is in the governmental unit.
With the advent of the Interstate System and the numerous access
problems it presents, the Indiana Supreme Court appears to be moving
away from applying a double standard-one in suits against private in-
dividuals and another in suits against governmental units. A recent
32. Egbert v. Lake S. & M.S. Ry., 6 Ind. App. 350, 33 N.E. 659 (1893).
33. 123 Ind. App. 473, 111 N.E.2d 899 (1953).
NOTES
case"' involved an existing street which was declared limited access. The
grade of the street was lowered, obstructing the abutting land owner's
access thereto. It may be inferred from the court's opinion that the land
owner was denied access and that this denial was a taking of a property
right for which compensation must be paid. In speaking of the right of
access the court did not mention the ownership of the fee simple, and in
supporting the premise that a right of access is a property right, it cited
cases which were between private persons. Although this case is not a
clear holding that the right of access as against the State is no longer
based on ownership of the fee in the street, it is important because it in-
dicates the attitude of the court toward the new limited access highways.
The case indicates that the court now believes that an abutting land owner
has a right of access in the existing highway or street which may not be
taken or materially interfered with without compensation.
The problems created by limited access highways are not solved
when the courts determine that an abutter must be compensated when-
ever an existing right of access is impaired or destroyed, for much of the
Interstate System will be constructed on new right of way3" to which no
right of access was previously available to abutting land owners. This
dedication of an entirely new limited access highway is a relatively recent
innovation. For many years highways conceptually served a dual pur-
pose: first, they were designed to serve through traffic, and second,
they also served the land which abutted them. The latter of these con-
cepts explains the court's recognition that an abutting land owner has a
property right in the land service road, but the sole function of the limited
access facility is to serve through traffic. The right of access from land
abutting a land service highway is acquired by implication from the pur-
pose of the highway, and it arises upon completion of such highway.
When a limited access highway or traffic service highway is constructed
on new right of way the purpose to serve the abutting land cannot be im-
plied, and the right of access never arises."6
Because the traffic service concept is applied to limited access high-
ways, a distinction must be made between damage to the remaining land
because of the character of the highway and the failure to provide the
abutting land owner with access to the new limited access highway. The
former is a compensable item of damage while the latter is not. This
34. State v. Marion Cir. Ct., 238 Ind. 637, 153 N.E.2d 327 (1958).
35. In congested areas where an existing highway has attracted businesses, filling
stations, motels and residences, the cost of extinguishing their rights of access may be
prohibitive.
36. Schneider v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 439, 241 P.2d 1 (1952) ; State Highway Comm'n
v. Burk, 200 Or. 211, 265 P.2d 783 (1954).
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problem often arises where the limited access highway completely severs
a farm so that it can no longer be operated as a unit. Under such cir-
cumstances, damage results, not because access to the new highway is de-
nied, but because access is denied between the two parts of the farm.
Access could be granted to the highway from one part of the farm and
yet not provide access between the two severed parts. The difficulty of
discerning between these two factors has apparently led to questionable
decisions in some cases. In Riddle v. State Highway Comin'n,? the land
was not severed, but a strip of land was taken from the rear of the
owner's tract. The court, however, held that the limited access character
of the highway could be considered by the jury in determining damages
to the remaining land, and in support of the decision cited a case where
the highway divided a farm. The limited access feature of the highway
in determining damages to the land remaining, however, has relevance
only when the land is severed, a distinction which escaped the court in
the Riddle case.
If a right of access is destroyed or materially interfered with, the
state must pay for the taking or impairment of this right. It must be de-
termined, first, what action by the state results in a taking or impairment
of this right. Generally, the state is not required to respond in damages
when it regulates the flow of traffic upon the street, as by construction
of lane divider strips3" and left turn restrictions39 or traffic diversion."0
The criterion of whether or not a right of access has been taken or
impaired is whether the access permitted is reasonable, considering the
uses to which the property is adapted.4 ' That the abutting land owner
37. 184 Kan. 603, 339 P.2d 301 (1959).
38. State v. Ensley, 164 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 1960) ; Iowa State Highway Comm'n v.
Smith, 248 Ia. 869, 82 N.W.2d 755 (1957).
39. Jones Beach Blvd. Estate, Inc. v. Moses, 268 N.Y. 362, 197 N.E. 313 (1935).
40. State v. Ensley, 164 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 1960) ; Heller v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry.,
28 Kan. 446 (1882). The damages problem becomes complicated when the new limited
access highway is to be constructed on part of a tract which abuts on a highway from
which traffic will be diverted to the limited access highway. The usual measure of
damages is the difference between the value of the land remaining before the taking and
the value immediately after. This permits a jury to award damages because of a cessa-
tion or diminution of traffic passing the abutting land owner's land because a part of
his land was taken for construction of the new highway, and the instruction to the jury
should therefore be qualified to exclude such damages. In this situation, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin took the extraordinary step of reversing itself on rehearing. In its
original opinion, the court held that it was not error to refuse an instruction which
would have withdrawn from the jury's consideration any evidence as to destruction of
commercial value of the land remaining caused by diversion of traffic from the old
highway to the new. The usual instruction as to measure of damages to the remainder
was given and approved. On rehearing, however, the court held that the denied instruc-
tion should have been given and reversed the lower court. Carazalla v. State, 269 Wis.
593, 70 N.W.2d 208, rev'd on, rehearing 269 Wis. 608a, 71 N.W.2d 276 (1955).
41. People v. La Macchia, 41 Cal. 2d 738, 264 P.2d 15 (1953).
NOTES
has no right of access at every point where his land abuts the street is
aptly illustrated by Huff v. Indiana State Highway Conim'n.42 This case
involved the denial by the Commission of plaintiff's application for ac-
cess to a recently designated limited access highway which denied plain-
tiff access from the particular tract in question. The court stated, "we
hardly think it can be held that anyone wherever his land may be situated
has a constitutional right to a way of ingress and egress for a public
filling station along a state highway which has been declared a limited
access facility."43  Thus, the court upheld the power of the Commission
to freeze access to existing highways to those points existing at the time
the highway was designated as limited access. This power is not con-
strued, however, to permit the state to deny reasonable access without
responding in damages for the right taken.4 Access is unreasonable if
inadequate for the uses to which the abutting land is adapted. When
access rights are frozen by the designation of a highway as limited access
and existing access points are not adequate, the abutting land owner must
either be permitted to utilize his right to the fullest extent, or the state
must pay for the right taken." In addition, that an abutting land owner
has not exercised his right of access by providing physical means of ac-
cess prior to the designation of a highway as limited access does not de-
prive him of the right, for it cannot be said that no access is reasonable
access.1
Closely related to the problem of determining reasonableness of ac-
cess is the problem of determining whether the right of access attaches to
the entire tract of land or only to that part which is immediately adjacent
to the existing highway. The problem arises where a limited access high-
way divides land so that access to the old highway is no longer possible
from part of the land. The new limited access highway denies access
to an existing highway. The reasonable rule is that the right attaches to
the entire tract. The owner of a farm is entitled to access to the highway
from both the near and distant portions of his property, and the courts
should not determine arbitrarily how far the right extends.
In congested areas, the state has often attempted to solve the access
problem by providing abutting land owners with a frontage road which
runs parallel with the through lanes. Although access to the through
42. 238 Ind. 280, 149 N.E.2d 299 (1958).
43. Id. at 287, 149 N.E.2d at 303.
44. People v. La Macchia, 41 Cal. 2d 738, 264 P.2d 15 (1953).
45. Ibid.
46. Iowa State Highway Comm'n v. Smith, 248 Ia. 869, 82 N.W.2d 755 (1957);
Petition of Burnquist, 220 Minn. 48, 19 N.W.2d 394 (1945).
47. Carazalla v. State, 269 Wis. 593, 70 N.W.2d 208, rev'd on rehearing 269 Wis.
608a, 71 N.W.2d 276 (1955).
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lanes is withdrawn, access is provided to the parallel frontage road which
ultimately has access to both lanes of the limited access highway. That
the abutting land owner's right has been taken iii this situation is beyond
question, and the state must pay damages for this confiscated property
right. It has been held, however, that the nature of the right of access
is an easement, the value of which is determined by the amount of dam-
age resulting to the dominant tenement from its taking. The benefits be-
stowed on the dominant tenement by construction of the frontage road
are deducted from the damages caused by taking the easement.48 Thus,
where access is provided in either direction upon the frontage road and
ultimately access to the through lanes, it should be capable of proof that
the benefits of the frontage road offset completely the damage caused by
the taking of the right of access. This rule is an equitable one, for the
state has gone to considerable expense to provide the substitute access
road, and by adhering to this method, the state preserves the right of the
abutting property owners without detriment to the through raffic upon
the limited access highway.
The problem of access to the limited access highway itself is only
slightly removed from the problem presented by the dead end street or
cul de sac. In the construction of a limited access highway, the crossing
streets or roads will either be dead ended at the limited access highway or
will pass over or under it. The property owners abutting the dead ended
streets are left in a cul de sac. It is well settled in Indiana that as between
private parties the ". . . owner of a lot on a street in a city or town has
a private right of access in both directions which extends as far at least as
the next connecting highway."" The question, however, whether this
right is recognized as against the state remains undecided. Of the states
which have considered the cul de sac problem in the context of the limited
access highway, California"0 and Oklahoma"' permit recovery while Ken-
tucky 2 and Iowa" do not. The California court held that the state ma-
terially interfered with the abutting land owner's right of access by plac-
ing his lot in a cul de sac. 4  Since this "material interference test" is ap-
plied in Indiana to determine whether there is a taking of the right of
48. Gilmore v. State, 208 Misc. 427, 143 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Ct. Cl. 1955). One dollar
awarded for taking of right of access.
49. Oler v. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St.L. Ry., 184 Ind. 431, 440, 111 N.E. 619, 622
(1916).
50. Schneider v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 439, 241 P.2d 1 (1952) ; Bacich v. Board of Con-
trol of Cal., 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).
51. Oklahoma Turnpike Authority v. Chandler, 316 P.2d 828 (Okla. 1957).
52. Smick v. Commonwealth, 268 S.W.2d 424 (Ky. 1954).
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NOTES
access in the eminent domain sense, and in view of the Indiana court's
apparent change of attitude towards the right of access as against the
state, it would seem a justified prognostication that an abutting land
owner who is placed in a cul de sac by the state suffers compensable
damage.
THE "TRANSFER INTENDED" CLAUSE IN INDIANA
INHERITANCE TAX
A prolific source of litigation is a clause found in the majority of in-
heritance tax statutes taxing transfers intended to take effect in posses-
sion and enjoyment at or after the death of the transferor.' This litiga-
tion of the scope of the "transfer intended" clause principally involves
transfers by inter vivos trust, perhaps because of their flexibility. 2  The
courts agree that a transfer wherein the transferor retains a beneficial in-
terest in the transferred property is a "transfer intended." A beneficial
interest in trust property has been held to consist of a life estate in the
income,' a power of revocation, alteration, or amendment,4 or a general
power of appointment.' Many statutes today explicitly state that reten-
tion of these interests will cause taxation.'
Control, when it has been considered separately, has been held to con-
stitute a beneficial interest only when it amounts to a lawful economic in-
1. Hereinafter referred to as "transfer intended."
2. E.g., Settlor creates an inter vivos trust providing for the income to accumulate
until his death, then to the beneficiary; or, settlor creates a trust with benefits to another
for the settlor's life, remainder to a third person.
3. In re Hubbs, 41 Ariz. 466, 19 P.2d 672 (1933) ; Hackett v. Bankers Trust Co.,
122 Conn. 107, 187 Atl. 653 (1936) ; Blodgett v. Guaranty Trust Co., 114 Conn. 207, 158
Atl. 245 (1932), aff'd 287 U.S. 509 (1933) ; People v. Forman, 322 Ill. 223, 153 N.E.
376 (1926) ; Crocker v. Shaw, 174 Mass. 266, 54 N.E. 549 (1899) ; it re Estate of Rising
186 Minn. 56, 242 N.W. 459 (1932) ; Chase v. Commissioner of Taxation, 226 Minn. 521,
33 N.W. 2d 706 (1948) ; In re Kohrs', 122 Mont. 145, 199 P.2d 856 (1948) ; Kimball v.
Potter, 89 N.H. 234, 196 Atl. 272 (1938) ; It re Brockett's Estate, 111 N.J. Eq. 183, 162
At. 150 (Preg. Ct. 1932) ; In re Perry's Estate, 111 N.J. Eq. 176, 162 At. 146 (Preg.
Ct. 1932) ; Matter of Keeney's Estate, 194 N. Y. 281, 87 N.E. 428 (1906), aff'd 222 U.S.
525, (1912) ; Matter of Garcia's Estate, 183 App. Div. 712, 170 N.Y. Supp. 980 (1918) ;
It re Bass, 200 Okla. 14, 190 P.2d 800 (1947) ; In re Ellis, 169 Wash. 581, 14 P.2d 37
(1932).
4. Bryant v. Hackett, 118 Conn. 233, 171 Atl. 664 (1934) ; Topping v. McLaughlin,
125 Conn. 456, 6 A.2d 343 (1939) ; Cochran v. McLaughlin, 129 Conn. 176, 27 A.2d 120
(1942).
5. Hackett v. Eastwick's Estate, 118 Conn. 233, 171 At. 664 (1934) ; Hill v. Trea-
surer & Receiver Gen., 229 Mass. 474, 118 N.E. 891 (1918); In re Stewart,131 N.Y.
274, 30 N.E. 184 (1892) ; Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U.S. 260 (1928).
6. CAL. REV. & TAx CODE §§ 13641-13648; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 375 (Smith-
Hurd 1954); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 72.01 (1957).
